Is a defendant's silence in the face of allegations of sexual assault admissible as an admission?

Defendant contends that the admission of evidence of the undenied accusations constituted reversible error. Citing People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 373, 303 P.2d 730, and People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 238-239, 187 P.2d 706, to the effect that silence in the face of an accusation is not admissible as an admission when that silence is upon the advice of counsel, defendant argues for a rule which in essence would require a holding that his silence must be presumed to have been based upon the advice he could expect to receive from any counsel he later retained. It is further asserted that to permit the use of his silence in the face of an accusation as an admission has the practical effect of denying him the right to counsel and due process of law.