Is a defendant's right to request a continuance of his trial when he wishes to represent himself?

No useful purpose would be served in again relating or listing the numerous continuances and the changes of attorneys in this case. Suffice it to say that appellant clearly stated that he wanted to represent himself. In People v. Thomas, 58 Cal.2d 121, 131--132, 23 Cal.Rptr. 161, 166, 373 P.2d 97, 102, it is appropriately said:

'It is manifest that no abuse of discretion can be charged to the court in bringing the matter to trial when it did. 'To hold that a defendant charged with crime has an absolute right to counsel of his own selection, with unlimited right to insist upon continuances of his trial, would be subversive of the prompt administration and execution of the laws--upon which depends largely their effectiveness. It is at once apparent that the trial court must in the nature of things have some control over such matters, to the end that judicial business may be dispatched in an orderly manner; and if it has any discretion it is apparent to us that such discretion was not abused in this particular instance.' (Citations.) On at least two prior occasions defendant's statements to the court that he was proceeding in propria persona and did not want appointed counsel constituted waivers of his right thereto. 'The right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, like any other legal right, may be invoked only in the course of orderly procedure. A defendant who, with an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act, declines the aid of counsel prior to or at the commencement of his trial, is not entitled thereafter to interrupt and delay the hearing at any stage he deems advantageous merely to interpose a demand for legal assistance. (Citations.) When petitioner stated at the time of his arraignment that he did not need an attorney, the court was justified in taking him at his word (citations). His attitude, both at [66 Cal.2d 679] that time and at the commencement of the trial, was equivalent to a final declination of counsel. * * * ' (Citation.) In the instant case it cannot be said that the waiver was not comprehended and understood by defendant. (Citation.)'

And in People v. Ortiz, 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 116--117, 15 Cal.Rptr. 398, 401, it is stated:

'* * * It has been declared to be a 'sound concept that it is the duty of the

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