Is a decision on immigration status a "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding that does not trigger a right to counsel?

other grounds by United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 63435 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc); State v. Cook, 150 Ariz. 470, 724 P.2d 556, 561 (1986). PlaintiffsAppellants argue that in light of the immigration status determinations that now may take place at IAs, these pre-Proposition 100 precedents no longer apply.

We employ a three-factor test to determine whether an event constitutes a critical stage of a prosecution. If (1) failure to pursue strategies or remedies results in a loss of significant rights, (2) skilled counsel would be useful in helping the accused understand the legal confrontation, or (3) the proceeding tests the merits of the accused's case, then the proceeding is a critical stage triggering the right to counsel. United States v. Bohn, 890 F.2d 1079, 108081 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 69899 (9th Cir.1989)). Applying this test, IAs in Arizonaeven those that include Proposition 100 status determinationsdo not trigger the right to counsel.