Is a court's order imposing sanctions against an attorney for failing to specify with particularity the basis for awarding sanctions?

Finally, the court's order imposing sanctions was not defective for failing to specify with particularity the basis for awarding sanctions. Unlike other statutes authorizing sanctions (e.g., sections 128.5, subd. (c), 177.5) the discovery statutes do not require the court's order to "recite in detail" the circumstances justifying the award. (Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 382, fn. 3, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 43.) Indeed, the trial court is not required to make findings at all. (Estate of Ruchti (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1603, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 151.) Here, the record shows the court read the moving and responding papers, listened to oral argument, re-read the papers and concluded it could find "no reason why these x-rays should not be taken." We find no error in the manner in which the court proceeded.

Unlike monetary sanctions against a party, which are based on the party's misuse of the discovery process, monetary sanctions against the party's attorney require a finding the "attorney advis[ed] that conduct." ( 2023, subd. (b)(1); Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200, 226 Cal.Rptr. 247 (construing similar language in former section 2034, subd. (b)(2)(D)).) In Corns v. Miller, the court held the burden was on the attorney to prove he or she had not advised the client to engage in the conduct resulting in sanctions. (181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 200-201, 226 Cal.Rptr. 247.)