In what circumstances will a prosecutor be allowed to excuse prospective juror No. 389 from a jury panel?

The prosecutor set forth several race-neutral reasons justifying his decision to excuse prospective juror No. 389. First, he was concerned by the prospective juror's demeanor throughout the day. In addition to expressing concern about scheduling, prospective juror No. 389 appeared disinterested in the proceedings. Race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror's demeanor, such as nervousness or inattention. (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 614.) "A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons." (Id. at p. 613.) When demeanor is cited as a reason for a peremptory challenge, the trial court must evaluate if the prosecutor's demeanor belies a discriminatory intent and if "the juror's demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor." (Id. at p. 614.) Additionally, the prosecutor was concerned about this prospective juror's involvement in a fight, and the fact he had never served on a jury before. While the prosecutor made some factual errors about the circumstances of the fight, this does not in and of itself indicate the existence of a racial bias on the prosecutor's part. The prosecutor explained that he was concerned about the fight because it could indicate this prospective juror might "minimize any violent conduct."

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The trial court evaluated the prosecutor's reasons and determined they were genuine and race-neutral. The court had the benefit of contemporaneous observations of voir dire. There is nothing apparent from the questions asked by the prosecutor during voir dire which raises the specter of purposeful discrimination. Since exceptional circumstances do not appear, we defer to the trial court's credibility assessment. (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614.) Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's ruling and conclude appellants' constitutional jury trial and fair trial rights were not infringed.

B. The motion to dismiss the jury panel was properly denied.