In what circumstances will a defendant waiver his right to attend the jury view of the crime scene?

As in People v. Weaver, we find nothing to suggest defendant's waiver of his right to attend the jury view of the crime scene was other than knowing and intelligent. To the extent he now contends his waiver was invalid because he believed he was waiving only the right to ride on the bus, not the right to actually be present at the jury view, we reject that suggestion, both because he failed to raise an objection on this ground at trial and because it is inconsistent with a reasonable reading of the record. Moreover, to the extent defendant now contends the trial court bore a special duty to conduct a more searching substantive inquiry regarding his understanding of his waiver, we reject the claim as both forfeited by a failure to object and because it is legally unsupported. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 967, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.)

Turning to defendant's statutory claim, we find defendant similarly fails to establish entitlement to relief. We previously explained in People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 967-968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103, that a capital defendant's ability to waive the right to be present at trial is severely limited by statute. (See 977.) But even assuming the court committed error by accepting defendant's waiver, any error was statutory only and thus "is reversible only if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to defendant absent the error." (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1196, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Because defendant provides no basis on which one could conclude the result of his trial would have been different had he attended the jury view, we find any violation of section 977 was harmless.