In what circumstances have juries been instructed to determine the burden of proof in a motor vehicle case?

'In Akers v. Cowan, 26 Cal.App.2d 694, 80 P.2d 143, and Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal.App.2d 97, 64 P.2d 995, it is held that section 513 declares the rule as to burden of proof in civil cases, and that the above quoted paragraph of section 511 is applicable only to criminal actions.

'In Akers v. Cowan, supra, the district court of appeal reversed the judgment for plaintiff for instructions similar to those given in the instant case. There, as in the instant case, the court read both sections 511 and 513 to the jury. The court held that the effect of reading both provisions to the jury was to give conflicting instructions. The court said [26 Cal.App.2d 694, 80 P.2d 144]:

"In connection with the prima facie speed limits thus given to the jury the above instruction included the second paragraph of Section 511 of the Vehicle Code, which sets forth the rule applicable in criminal actions where a defendant is charged with traveling on a highway at a rate of speed higher than the prima facie limits set forth in that section. In such a case the burden is placed upon the defendant of proving that any speed in excess of these limits did not constitute a violation of the basic rule set forth in section 510. A contrary rule prevails in civil actions, which rule is set forth in section 513 of this code. The question of speed was here material and important and the giving to the jury of this wrong instruction with reference to the burden of proof in connection with that issue was plainly erroneous. Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal.App.2d 97, 64 P.2d 995."