In a wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn foetus, how have the majority argued against the majority's position?

The majority next contends that the establishment of such an action would create tremendous difficulty in proving causation and damages. It is sufficient, I feel, to note that these same two arguments were unsuccessfully advanced in the Woods litigation. In disposing of them at that time, this court declared (303 N.Y., p. 356, 102 N.E.2d p. 695, Supra): '(These arguments have) to do with the supposed difficulty of proving or disproving that certain injuries befell the unborn child, or that they produced the defects discovered at birth, or later. Such difficulties there are, of course, and, indeed, it seems to be commonly accepted that only a blow of tremendous force will ordinarily injure a foetus, so carefully does nature insulate it. But such difficulty of proof or finding is not special to this particular kind of lawsuit (and it is beside the point, anyhow, in determining sufficiency of a pleading). Every day in all our trial courts * * * such issues are disposed of, and it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a legal right.' I perceive no valid reason for seizing upon these arguments as a means for sustaining the majority's position. Indeed, this portion of our decision in Woods was cited approvingly by a court of a sister State which refused to deny a wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn foetus merely because of the difficulty attached to proving damages. (Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d[24 N.Y.2d 493] 901, 906 (Ky.).) In like manner, the contention that the present action would create an 'unmerited bounty' is both ill founded and, in light of Woods, jurisprudentially unsound.