In a death penalty case, can a jury be misled into believing that the sentencing decision lies elsewhere?

the sentencing decision lies elsewhere." (Ledesma , supra , at p. 733, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657, discussing Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1.)

To determine whether the jury was misled, we must ask how a reasonable juror would have understood the challenged instruction. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 476, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793 ; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 ["in reviewing an ambiguous instruction ..., we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution"].) We find the trial court's instruction regarding the method of execution could not reasonably have misled the jury into believing ultimate responsibility for its penalty decision lay elsewhere. The court truthfully informed the jury that execution by lethal gas was no longer the only option because a new law would enable defendant to elect an alternative method of execution. Nothing about that information suggested responsibility for the jury's life-or-death decision lay anywhere other than with the 12 jurors. Although the instruction communicated to the jury that the method of execution would, to some degree, be defendant's choice, such information is not equivalent to informing the jury that it should consider its role in any way diminished. We thus reject as unreasonable defendant's claim the instruction told "the jurors that the final decision on [defendant's] execution rested with [her] ... thus diminishing their sense of responsibility for their penalty decision." Accordingly, we find the instruction did not violate defendant's rights under the Eighth Amendment.