In a civil commitment proceeding, is the exclusionary rule applied?

4 In addition to the clear social costs of application of the exclusionary rule in LPS Act civil commitment proceedings, there are practical difficulties that the majority does not address. For example, there is no statutory equivalent in the Welfare and Institutions Code to the procedures for suppression established by Penal Code section 1538.5 and related statutes. After the majority's ruling, courts will be forced to fashion new procedures appropriate to the LPS Act, and counsel will be faced with the difficult task of determining when and how suppression motions should be brought. To what extent should the entire panoply of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence be imported? For example, it would be difficult to countenance the suppression of all evidence that a proposed conservatee was gravely disabled where the evidence was the fruit of some constable's initial blunder, and it is hard to imagine the trial court in an involuntary commitment proceeding holding a hearing under Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667. In addition, it is not clear how suppression rulings will be reviewed. For example, if the majority here had determined the failure to suppress was prejudicial, what further proceedings could we order? Moreover, there are difficulties that will face police and social service agencies; for example, if a social service agency has determined it must obtain a warrant, to what court must it apply, and what showing will be required to justify issuance? To me, these unaddressed difficulties are additional reasons against applying the exclusionary rule in these proceedings.