The following excerpt is from Deleon v. Strack, 234 F.3d 84 (2nd Cir. 2000):
We did just that in United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1997). There, a juvenile defendant in a criminal case did not object to a magistrate judge's recommendation to deny his motion to suppress his confession. See id. at 37. Nevertheless, the district court undertook a de novo review of the admissibility of the defendant's confession, hearing testimony from multiple witnesses before reaching the same result as the magistrate judge. See id. at 37-38. After the district court found the defendant guilty of the crime charged, he appealed, arguing that the district court had erroneously denied his motion to suppress. See id. at 38. We concluded that the waiver rule promoted judicial economy by "prevent[ing] a litigant from sandbagging the district judge by failing to object and then appealing," id. at 39 (internal citations and quotation
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marks omitted, alteration in original), and that this purpose would not be served in denying appellate review when a district court has chosen to examine the merits of the case de novo, see id. "Even if neither party objects to the magistrate's recommendation, the district court is not bound by the recommendation of the magistrate," Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989), and if in the absence of any party's objection a district court undertakes de novo review of a magistrate's report, there is no danger that an appellant will raise issues that were never considered by the district court. Similarly, permitting a party to appeal from a district court's sua sponte review of a magistrate judge's report to which no objections have been filed does not prevent other district courts from relying on such reports instead of undertaking de novo or other review.
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