How have we reversed a conviction where we found strong indications that an erroneous supplemental charge made a special impression on the jury?

Thus, we have reversed a conviction where we found strong indications that an erroneous supplemental charge made a special impression on the jury. Arroyo v. Jones, 685 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982). There, the indications of influence included the jury's evident confusion about the original charge and its rapid verdict after hearing the erroneous charge. In addition, the incorrect instruction was brief and pointed, isolated from the main charge, and the last statement heard by the jury prior to resuming deliberations.

By contrast, we have affirmed a conviction where the circumstances made it extremely unlikely that the jury was influenced by an erroneous charge. For example, in Rock v. Coombe, supra, the incorrect charge was preceded and followed by proper instructions, and the jury deliberated for several hours after hearing the erroneous statement. In those circumstances, we found no basis for inferring that the jury had seized on the improper charge. 694 F.2d at 917.