How have the courts treated the voir dire of prospective jurors in a murder trial?

Were we to address this claim on the merits, it would fail. An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's conduct of the voir dire of prospective jurors. (See Code Civ. Proc., ? 223.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling

[24 Cal.Rptr.3d 521]

"`fall[s] "outside the bounds of reason."'" (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, quoting People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) The trial court did not act unreasonably in allowing counsel to prescreen prospective jurors whose questionnaires showed they were probably subject to challenge and excusal. (See Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 72-74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Both defense counsel and the prosecutor recognized upon review of the questionnaires alone that they did not want to accept any of these prospective jurors, and neither felt it necessary to inquire further into the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty. Instead of pursuing additional questioning, they mutually agreed to reject these prospective jurors. Defendant fails to show how this procedure was unreasonable.

[24 Cal.Rptr.3d 521]

Finally, defendant argues that because he was absent when the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the excusal of these eight prospective jurors, he was denied the right to be present at a critical stage of the trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. (United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486.)