How have the courts interpreted the test for reasonable doubt in a sexual assault case?

Instructing a jury that a reasonable doubt is "a doubt for which some good reason can be given" fundamentally misstates the reasonable doubt standard and impermissibly risks a finding of guilt by a standard less than the constitutionally required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The concept of reasonable doubt serves to place at a high level the degree of certainty that must exist in the minds of jurors before they may find a defendant guilty. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ("Reasonable doubt" standard serves to "impress[ ] upon the fact-finder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused."). The standard imposes no obligation whatever upon any juror to explain the juror's thought processes to the other members of the jury. No juror need give any reason for entertaining a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt, much less the "good" reason required by the trial judge's instruction to the jury that convicted Chalmers.