How have the courts interpreted the term "prevailing party" in a rental agreement?

Defendants propose a different analysis of the issue, but even if we were to accept their approach, it would not yield a different result. In this court, defendants argue they are entitled to attorney fees because they are the prevailing parties based on a "pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives." (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 621.) As defendants concede, however, the attorney fee provision of the rental agreements does not define the term "prevailing party." Where the contract provides no definition, the trial court must use its discretion to decide which party has prevailed. (See Chinn v. KMR Property Management (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 175, 193.) In exercising that discretion, the trial court may consider the extent to which the parties have achieved their respective litigation objectives. (See ibid.) Here, the trial court concluded that neither party fully achieved its objectives and thus no party should

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be considered to have prevailed. "Whether we would have made the same determination in the first instance is immaterial. As long as the contested decision is supported by reasonable inferences, we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court." (Lincoln v. Schurgin, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 105-106.) We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.¹²