How have the courts interpreted the substantial evidence rule in the context of a search warrant application?

The Attorney General relies upon the substantial evidence rule. He points to a trial court finding that the boy was not a police agent but a voluntary actor whose offer to fetch a sample of his father's contraband was accepted by the police. The deference owed to the trial court's factual finding gives way when the finding is entwined with a constitutionally inacceptable test. (Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 77, 69 Cal.Rptr. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819.) The crux is not the citizen's eagerness but the policeman's involvement. Certainly the boy's activities were voluntary. He responded to his own wishes, however agonized, and not to police [19 Cal.App.3d 326] pressure. The decisive factor was the extent of official involvement in the total enterprise. (People v. Fierro, supra.) The sheriff's sergeant made inquiries which satisfied him of his action's propriety, ascertained that the time was ripe for surreptitious entry, supplied the transportation, described the quantity, waited for the purloined material and made it a basis for a search warrant application. Official participation in the foray was obvious, heavy and undebatable.

The Attorney General correctly abstains from arguing a consent theory. There are cases where a member of the family consents to a police search of jointly occupied premises. (See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.App.3d 1048, 87 Cal.Rptr. 876.) The policy must reasonably

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