How have the courts interpreted the Miranda right to remain silent?

The claim that appellant invoked the right to remain silent is something of a red herring. Appellant did not refuse to speak with the police; to the contrary, he appeared to be quite willing to speak with them and quite willing to speak with the District Attorney's investigator. Even when he stated that he did not wish to talk further, and asked to be "let go," appellant's request, in context, was not so much an invocation of the right to remain silent as a request to postpone any further discussion until he had the opportunity to rest and get something to eat. He confirmed this interpretaion of his motive the following day, agreeing that he had indicated to the detectives that he wished to speak with them, but only after resting. (See People v. Bolden (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 707, 712-713, recognizing that a request to talk "later" is not the same thing as an invocation of the right to remain silent.)

It is, however, troubling that the investigator and detectives continued to question appellant on March 6, notwithstanding his expressed desire that questioning cease, and that they stopped the questioning only after appellant stated that "It wasn't planned," "Let me get on my way and you will get all that, okay?" and only after he gave his "word" to speak with them again. The record, accordingly, raises the inference that appellant was responding to coercive police conduct by saying whatever needed to be said in order to be permitted to leave. The court, as noted, ruled that appellant's responses were inadmissible, but it did admit the statement made by him the following day. When a defendant's statement, although following coercive police conduct was not made in direct response to the coercive conduct, the inquiry is whether the statement was sufficiently the product of appellant's free will as to purge the primary taint of the illegality of the coercive conduct; i.e., whether "the connection between the [first interrogation] and the confession 'had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." ' " (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 108; citing Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 491.)

Once it is established that coercive police conduct had occurred, the burden shifts to the prosecution " 'to prove that the taint has been "purged" and hence that the evidence is admissible in spite of the primary illegality. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 108.) The question of whether that burden has been met and a confession shown to be the product of free will, must be answered on the facts of each case. "No single fact is dispositive . . . . The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of [the illegality]. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of [the illegality] and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.' [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 108-109.)⁸

It is quite clear that appellant was well aware of his right to remain silent and of the consequences that would attend a confession. Although the police conduct was coercive, appellant appeared to be perfectly able to resist that coercion, maintaining his non-involvement with the crime throughout the March 6 interview. Even his words that "It wasn't planned," and "Let me get on my way and you will get all that, okay," are hardly admissions. Thus, there was no particular reason for appellant to have felt after the March 6 interview that he irrevocably had " 'let the cat [of his guilt] out of the bag.' " (People v. Montano, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 938.⁹)