How have the courts interpreted the meaning of the word "reconstitutionally modified" in the context of Proposition 73's contribution restrictions?

By construing (and thus effectively reforming) the statutory language in this fashion, the high court in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, clearly modified the wording and restricted the reach of the electoral reform legislation before it. The court's decision in that case establishes, however, that such judicial action did not amount to an impermissible judicial rewriting of the statute or an improper substitution of the court's own policy judgments for those of the legislative branch even though the statute as judicially construed differed in some respects from the reporting and disclosure scheme as enacted. In my view, reforming Proposition 73's flawed contribution restrictions with the modified election cycle limits would constitute no more an impermissible rewriting or substitution of policy judgments than the high court's actions in Buckley v. Valeo.