How have the courts interpreted the constitutional rights of the attorney general in a motion to compel disclosure of confidential information?

12 Those constitutional rights have been characterized in Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 325-326, 85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673, as prohibiting the compelled discovery of any defense information that conceivably might lighten the load the People must shoulder in proving their case-in-chief. This is based upon the defendant's right against self-incrimination which "forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a 'link in a chain' of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense...." ( Id., at p. 326, 85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673. See also, In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 546-551, 213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637.)

13 We are not unmindful of the fact that the governmental entity's role is likely to be severely limited by its lack of knowledge as to the factual and legal basis for defendant's motion if some or all of the defendant's confidentiality claim is sustained. However, its position is not different from that of a defendant who seeks review, for example, of an order denying his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informer following an in camera hearing from which the defendant and his counsel are excluded. (Evid.Code, 1042, subd. (d).) In both cases, the parties must do the best they can with the information they have, and the appellate court will fill the gap by objectively reviewing the whole record. (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 395, fn. 22, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173.)