How have courts treated false representations in real estate transactions?

The cases cited by defendants are not in point, as the false representations in them were not material inducements. In People v. Bliss (1920), 47 Cal.App. 503, 190 P. 1046, the defendant falsely stated that she was possessed of certain moneys and owned several valuable pieces of property in addition to a valuable mining property which she did own, a one-third interest in which she sold to the complaining witness. She also promised him a job at the mine. He received both the interest and the job. There was no contention that [207 Cal.App.2d 95] he was buying any interest in the nonexistent properties. The court held that the misrepresentations were not material to the sale.

In People v. Tufts (1914), 167 Cal. 266, 139 P. 78, the defendant falsely represented that he had a power of attorney from his wife so that he could secure a loan by transferring certain notes. Although he had no power of attorney he did have authority to make the transfer. Thus the misrepresentation was not material.

In People v. Morphy (1893), 100 Cal. 84, 34 P. 623, the defendant sold groceries to a retail grocer at a price he said was lower but in fact was higher than they could be obtained elsewhere. To effect the sale the defendant falsely stated that he was the representative of a San Francisco business house. The court held that the goods were sold at a fair price and not otherwise misrepresented; that the statement about the price being lower than elsewhere was merely a trick of the trade not within false pretenses; and that the buyer presumedly had knowledge of the value and could have inquired before purchase. The representation as to the capacity of the seller did not assume the proportions either in character or influence on the buyer which the representations did on the subscribers in our case.