How have courts treated a motion to substitute a defendant's appointed counsel?

In People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 it was held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying the defendant's motion to substitute new appointed counsel without giving the defendant an opportunity to state the reasons for his request. In the case at bench the defendant was afforded an opportunity to state the reasons for his request--a belief that another attorney may be able to go into the defense 'more thoroughly.' At no other time was any complaint articulated to the court, at no time did the defendant ever suggest an attorney for appointment by the court, and at no time did the defendant indicate that he would have the financial ability, either by himself or through friends or relatives, to retain private counsel. Considering all the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for continuance.

'The fairness of a trial is not to be predicated on any purported right of an accused to proceedings which are planned, directed or conducted by him, but rather on proceedings which will accord him the fullest opportunity to preserve all trial rights and successfully defend against the charges. Moreover, if an accused has been accorded a fair trial, subtle analyses which pretend to establish that he might have been better defended had different counsel or tactics been employed, cannot require by hindsight a conclusion that the trial was not, in fact, fair.' (People v. Sharp, 7 Cal.3d 448, 460, 103 Cal.Rptr. 233, 241, 499 P.2d 489, 457.)

We reject the concept advanced by the defendant that he had an inchoate constitutional right to nominate the counsel assigned to him pursuant to [29 Cal.App.3d 309] Penal Code section 987a (and the alleged corollary right to have the court advise him of his right to nominate assigned counsel). ² The adoption of such a policy could be destructive of sound judicial administration and would be contrary to the best interests of most indigent defendants. An indigent can best defend against criminal charges when competent counsel is appointed. (See People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, 460--461, 103 Cal.Rptr. 233, 499 P.2d 489.) We do not quarrel with the proposition that the input received by the judge in determining what attorney to appoint can also include a suggestion made by a defendant. In some cases it may be appropriate to follow the

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The defendant's contention that he was entitled to have another attorney appointed, because of an alleged conflict between himself and his court-appointed counsel, has no merit. "(T)here is no constitutional right to an attorney who will conduct the defense of the case in accordance with an indigent defendant's whims.' (Citations.) Further, it is well established that an attorney representing a criminal defendant has the power to control the court proceedings.' (People v. Floyd, 1 Cal.3d 694, 704, 83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 613, 464 P.2d 64, 69.) ³