How have courts interpreted the word "attempt" and "commit" in the context of assault?

Thus, the observation in People v. Carmen, supra, that "One could not very well 'attempt' or try to 'commit' an injury on the person of another if he had no intent to cause any injury to such other person" is technically accurate. (36 Cal.2d at p. 775, 228 P.2d 281.) The problem with this language, however, is that it tends to implicate a goal-oriented or specific intent state of mind. (See Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 457, fn. 6, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370.) This implication is misleading because for assault, as with any general intent crime, the nature of the defendant's present willful conduct alone suffices to establish the necessary mental state without inquiry as to an intent to cause further consequences. ⁸ (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d [865 P.2d 712] at pp. 456-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d

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