How have courts interpreted the presumption of consent when a petition is filed without the signature of the petitioner?
The following excerpt is from Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000):
6. Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 1996) (invoking presumption of consent when a petitioner who sought to avoid the restrictions on second habeas petitions claimed he had not authorized his attorney to file the first petition); Lucky v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that the presumption of consent to petition filed by counsel without the petitioner's signature is rebutted by petitioner's failure to respond to counsel but that petitioner could later authorize it by showing that the petition is presently authorized).
6. Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 1996) (invoking presumption of consent when a petitioner who sought to avoid the restrictions on second habeas petitions claimed he had not authorized his attorney to file the first petition); Lucky v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that the presumption of consent to petition filed by counsel without the petitioner's signature is rebutted by petitioner's failure to respond to counsel but that petitioner could later authorize it by showing that the petition is presently authorized).
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