How have courts interpreted the Miranda right of a criminal suspect to ask for a lawyer to be present at questioning?

In People v. Cockrell (1965) 63 Cal.2d 659, 670, 47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116, Justice Burke, for our unanimous court, declared that "even though it does not appear that [appellant] made any statement indicating that he was invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, he had a

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Finally, this defendant properly and in a timely manner invoked a legal right to remain silent. It is clear that after Miranda warnings (Miranda v. [47 Cal.3d 1043] Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) have been given, a suspect's right to remain silent must be protected against any adverse imputation. (Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d 91.) The question that arises here is whether defendant effectively invoked Miranda rights by demanding a lawyer to be present, even though the warnings had not been given. It seems clear to me that he did. Therefore any cross-examination and comment on his silence at that time and thereafter was clearly improper.

I need cite no additional authority to confirm the right of a criminal suspect to have counsel present at interrogation. United States v. Williams (D.C.Cir.1977) 556 F.2d 65, 67, held that "testimony about the desire or request for a lawyer is impermissible."