How have courts interpreted the meaning of section 28 of the California Constitution when it comes to the exclusion or limitation of prior felony convictions for impeachment?

The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other such rules are subordinate, is that the court should ascertain the intent of the lawmakers in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 571, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787, and cases cited there.) This controlling

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Moreover, "[i]t is well settled ... that a general provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter being treated as an exception to the former. A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates." (Rose v. State (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723-724, 123 P.2d 505.) We have no doubt that the People, in enacting Proposition 8, intended to retain a trial court's discretion over the admission of evidence generally. However, with regard to the exclusion or limitation of the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment they expressly withdrew discretion in subdivision (f) of section 28. The specific provision must be held to control the general, and we conclude that a trial court does not have the discretion to exclude prior felony convictions for use as impeachment.