How have courts interpreted the definition of the reasonable doubt standard?

As the majority notes in the beginning of its discussion section, trial courts have often been admonished for elaborating on the statutory description of the reasonable doubt standard. (People v. Garcia, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 65-66.) Appellate courts have warned that "'the term "reasonable doubt" best defines itself, '" and that "'[e]very attempt to explain [the definition of reasonable doubt] renders an explanation of the explanation necessary.'" (Id. at p. 66.) I believe this case is a classic example of one explanation of the reasonable doubt standard requiring a second explanation of the standard, which ultimately leads to a third explanation of the standard; yet none of the explanations accurately convey the meaning of reasonable doubt. The majority's opinion sends a mixed message, by initially endorsing the foregoing rule that it is best to let the term reasonable doubt define itself, but ultimately approving of the trial court's reasonable doubt examples. For example, the majority concludes that the weather

Page 12