How have courts interpreted the continuous conduct exception in determining whether a crime is continuous in nature?

In People v. Thompson, supra, involving a prosecution for spousal battery, the court explained that "[c]ases applying the continuous conduct exception have generally relied on statutory interpretation to justify a conclusion that the nature of the crime is ongoing." (160 Cal.App.3d at 225, 206 Cal.Rptr. 516.) The court noted the definition of the crime of spousal battery (Pen. Code, 273.5) parallels the definition of child abuse (Pen. Code, 273d), and concluded, relying on Ewing, that the statute defining spousal battery contemplates a continuous crime. (Id., at pp. 225-226, 206 Cal.Rptr. 516.) People v. Lewis (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 143 Cal.Rptr. 587 similarly focused [197 Cal.App.3d 415] on the statutory definition of the offense in determining whether the crime is continuous in nature. There the court noted the statute defining pimping (Pen. Code, 266h) is violated by any person who "... lives or derives support or maintenance" from a prostitute's earnings: "Reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition leads to but one conclusion--that the legislative intent was that living or deriving support or maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute or proceeds of her prostitution knowing her to be a prostitute is an ongoing continuing offense that occurs over a period of time." (At pp. 460-462, 143 Cal.Rptr. 587.)