How have courts considered the "preponderates heavily" standard in deciding whether to grant a Rule 33 motion for perjured testimony?

The "preponderates heavily" standard finds support in our decision in Sanchez , 969 F.2d 1409. There, we considered the district court's grant of a Rule 33 motion based on what the district judge considered to be perjured testimony. We first concluded that the district court erred in finding that several police officers committed perjury simply because their recollection of the events at issue differed. Id. at 1415. Since the testimony shared many consistent aspects, "the differences in testimony" presented, at most, "a credibility question for the jury." Id . But even discounting that testimony, we emphasized that "[i]t surely cannot be said ... that the evidence preponderate[d] heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. " Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez , 763 F.2d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 1985) ).