How has the law interpreted the character of an object in the context of the possession of a dangerous weapon?

Judicial construction is no more helpful. In People v. Ferguson (1933) 129 Cal.App. 300, 18 P.2d 741, the character of the object was admitted, the defense being that defendant possessed it only as a curio and without any intent to use it as a weapon--a defense which the court rejected. In People v. Quinones (1934) 140 Cal.App. 609, 35 P.2d 638, the major issue was the contention that the instrument therein involved (described as consisting 'of alternate strips of sheet lead and gum tape, making a set of knuckles somewhat in the shape of a bracelet and of size to fit over four finger knuckles') was not within the statute because not made entirely of metal. That contention the court rejected. In its discussion, it quoted (at page 611, 35 P.2d at page 639) from the Century Dictionary, saying: 'One of the common English meanings of 'knuckle' is 'a piece of metal, usually brass worn over the knuckles in order to protect them in striking a blow and to make the blow more effective.' Cent. Dict.' The court then pointed out that there was, in that case, expert testimony that the object therein in question was 'a pair of metal knuckles.' We advert to the latter statement at a later place in this opinion.

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