How has the felony-murder rule been interpreted in the legal context of criminal law?

25 One of the earliest expressions of this limitation appears in Powers v. Commonwealth (1901) 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 742: "Under our statute the removal of a corner stone is punishable by a short term in the penitentiary, and is therefore a felony. If, in attempting this offense, death were to result to one conspirator by his fellows accidentally dropping the stone upon him, no Christian court would hesitate to apply this ['inherently dangerous'] limitation.")

26 The Courts of Appeal have also found ways in which to limit the harsh application of the rule.

Consider People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321. There, the court reversed a second degree felony-murder conviction where the underlying felony, manslaughter of the accused's wife, furnished the basis for the second degree felony-murder conviction of an unborn fetus carried by the wife. The court found it "unnecessary to resort to the felony-murder rule where the homicide of two persons by the same act constitutes separate offenses for which separate prosecutions and conviction may be had independent of the short cut of the felony-murder rule." (Id., at p. 354, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) Such a finding was compelled by the conclusion "that a man assaulting two persons at the same time and by the same act would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule since the assault was an integral part of the resulting homicide of the two victims." (Ibid.)