How has the court treated a modification rather than a reversal of a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case?

Under Stockton Theatres and Snapp the question of when interest begins depends on substance, not formalism, and a reversal that effectively acts as a modification will be treated as such. So, for example, in Munoz v. City of Union City (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 199, 207, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 (Munoz ), the court concluded that a modification, rather than a reversal, had taken place where the original judgment had allocated fault among a victim, a police officer, and a city; the appellate court had concluded that a portion of the fault allocated to the city was not legally sustainable; and, in a second appeal, the court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment allocating fault between the remaining parties based on the jury's original allocation. (Id. at pp. 202203, 207, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 527.) The court noted, "Unlike the situation in Stockton ... here there was no factual determination to be made, no prerequisite to be satisfied before liability could be allocated properly." (Munoz, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 206, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 527; see also Ehret v. Congoleum Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 202, 204, 210, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 (Ehret ) [appellate decision reinstating original jury verdict after judgment notwithstanding verdict and calculating offsets based on original jury verdict treated as modification rather than reversal].)