How has the Court interpreted the principle of "due process" in the context of section 402(d)(8) of the Child Support Benefits Act?

We turn next to appellant's due process claim. Appellant contends that 402(d)(8) flies in the face of the principal developed in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), stating that a statute which purports to condition eligibility for a benefit upon satisfaction of a specified criterion in this case a child's dependency on its parent cannot, consistently with due process, conclusively presume that certain individuals fail to satisfy that criterion. Appellant argues that 402(d)(8) violates this principle because it purports to confer secondary benefits upon children dependent on a primary beneficiary but conclusively presumes that unrelated after-adopted children are not dependent on their adopting parent.