How has the court dealt with allegations of improper communication between one juror and another during jury deliberations?

The district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the alleged juror misconduct. Given that neither defendant requested that the jurors involved be questioned about the substance of the conversation, and that questioning jurors itself may "highlight[] the issue unnecessarily, disrupt[] the trial, and impair[] the ability of the jurors to deliberate with each other," the district court approached the alleged misconduct in a balanced manner. Cox, 324 F.3d at 88. The alleged misconduct at issue appeared to be a few brief statements from one juror to another after deliberations commenced and were ambiguous as to whether they constituted improper deliberations because the juror's statements could have easily been a reference to the court's instruction about the burden of proof, which had occurred earlier in the day. Importantly, "[n]ot every comment a juror may make to another juror about the case is a discussion about a defendant's guilt or innocence that comes within a common sense definition of deliberation." United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). In any event, the comments suggest that the juror was taking the oath seriously by understanding the gravity of the charges and the consequences for the defendants.

In addition, there was an insufficient basis to dismiss either juror where one juror was merely talking to the other juror about the general importance of ensuring that they did not convict an innocent man. Similarly, although one defense counsel requested that the other juror be asked whether her ability to be fair and impartial had been impacted by the conversation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so, especially given the benign nature of the comments and that "the possibility of any far-reaching conversation regarding views on the case was minimal." United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1998). Instead, the district court acted prudently in addressing the intra-jury communications by reminding the jury that it may not deliberate without the entire group present and making clear that such conduct would be

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a violation of the district court's rules. See United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 803 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The court has broad flexibility in such matters, especially when the alleged prejudice results from statements made by the jurors themselves, and not from media publicity or other outside influences." (quotation marks omitted)). Under these particular circumstances, the district court's "reiteration of its cautionary instructions to the jury is all that [was] necessary." Abrams, 137 F.3d at 708 (quoting Thai, 29 F.3d at 803). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's handling of the alleged juror misconduct.