How has Section 1432(a)(5) of the US Immigration Code been interpreted by the Court?

¹ Section 1432 was repealed in 2000 and replaced with a new derivative citizenship provision, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1431(a). The panel addressed the applicability of 1432(a)(5) (1994) in Cheneau's case because "[t]he applicable version [of the statute] is the one that was in effect at [the] time the critical events giving rise to eligibility occurred. " Cheneau , 971 F.3d at 968 (quoting Minasyan v. Gonzales , 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (2005) ). Which statute applied depended on whether the critical event was Cheneau's application for adjustment of status, filed in 2000, or his actually obtaining lawful permanent resident status in 2003. Whether either event qualified as the "critical event[ ] giving rise to eligibility" depended on the interpretation of 1432(a)(5). If the statute required lawful permanent resident status under each pathway, then Cheneau's 2003 acquiring of such status would be the critical event; if only some objective manifestation of "residing permanently" was necessary under the second pathway, then his 2000 application for adjustment of status would be the critical event. See Cheneau , 971 F.3d at 96869. The panel concluded that "[u]nder Romero-Ruiz , the critical event of Cheneau obtaining lawful permanent resident status happened in 2003, more than two years after 1432(a) was repealed, and that section is therefore not applicable." Id. at 970 (applying 8 U.S.C. 1431(a) instead).