How does the parol evidence rule apply to a fraudulent contract?

Where a writing discloses no promise or agreement and cannot be made clear as to its significance without resort to parol evidence, it is inadequate to satisfy the statute of frauds. (Franklin v. Hansen (1963) 59 Cal.2d 570, 574, 30 Cal.Rptr. 530, 381 P.2d 386.) "The parol evidence rule operates to bar extrinsic evidence which contradicts the terms of a written contract. [Citation.] It 'is not a rule of evidence but is one of substantive law. It does not exclude evidence for any of the reasons ordinarily requiring exclusion, based on the probative value of such evidence or the policy of its admission. The rule as applied to contracts is simply that as a matter of substantive law, a certain act, the act of embodying the complete terms of an agreement in a writing (the 'integration') becomes the contract of the parties. The point then is, not how the agreement is to be proved, because as a matter of law the writing is the agreement. Extrinsic evidence is excluded because it cannot serve to prove what the agreement was, this being determined as a matter of law to be the writing itself.' (Italics in original.) [Citations.] [p] In contrast to the rationale of the rule barring parol evidence, the 'Purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury with respect to certain agreements by requiring for enforcement the more reliable evidence of some writing

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