Does the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury before it began deliberating on lingering doubt?

We can readily address Reeds contention that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury before it began deliberating on lingering guilt. We have "put to rest" the "Cox dictum that a lingering doubt instruction may be required as a matter of statutory law." ( Hartsch , supra , 49 Cal.4th at pp. 512-513, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 673, 232 P.3d 663.) Rather, "the standard instructions on capital sentencing factors, together with counsels closing argument, are sufficient to convey the lingering doubt concept to the jury." ( Id . at p. 513, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 673, 232 P.3d 663 ; see also People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 369-370, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 386, 376 P.3d 528 ["Neither state nor federal law requires a trial court to instruct a penalty jury to consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation."].) Reed does not dispute that the

[4 Cal.5th 1013]