Does the rule of lenity apply to a defendant who has interpreted Proposition 36 differently than the other defendant?

Finally, we do not agree that the rule of lenity requires us to construe Proposition 36 to apply retroactively to defendant. The rule of lenity applies "`only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended.'" (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1.) That situation arises when "`two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute's ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable.'" (Ibid.) For the reasons stated above, we do not believe defendant's interpretation is reasonable. Hence, the rule of lenity cannot compel a different result.