Does the risk of undue prejudice outweigh a jury's decision not to consider a defendant's prior conviction for the purposes of determining his credibility as a witness?

outweighed" by the risk of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, 352.) "A trial court's exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears that the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of justice. [Citation.] In other words, discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. [Citation.]" (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 182-183.)

Here, defendant's criminal conduct was recent, occurring in 1997. His prior and present offenses are substantially different and thus, "the prejudicial factor before the jury is limited[.]" Although the prior crime was of a violent nature, it was no more violent than the circumstances surrounding defendant's present offense. The trial court's decision lay reasonably within its discretion. (See People v. Williams, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 957.)

Defendant "doubts if the jury could have limited the use of the evidence for impeachment rather than propensity." This assertion is unfounded. The jury received instruction regarding what it could use evidence of defendant's prior conviction for, specifically, in determining his believability as a witness only. "'The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions.' [Citations.]" (People v. Callahan (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 372.) We must assume the jury understood their duty to follow the instructions.