Does the requirement that a defendant "knowingly" permit the discharge of a firearm apply to a firearm discharge?

Defendants argue that "permitting" the discharge implies intending the discharge. However, one may knowingly assist another to commit a crime, yet lack a specific intent that the crime be committed (People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 558-559, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318); a fortiori, one may knowingly permit another to discharge a firearm, yet lack a specific intent that the firearm be discharged. Defendants also rely on cases holding that a "use" of a firearm does not include a negligent or involuntary use. (People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-674, 102 Cal.Rptr. 776, 498 P.2d 1024 [firearm use [52 Cal.App.4th 1469] enhancement under Pen.Code, 12022.5]; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 591-592, 248 P.2d 12 [eligibility for probation under Pen.Code, 1203].) Here, however, the requirement that the defendant "knowingly" permit the discharge of the firearm equally excludes a negligent or involuntary "permission."