Does the new designation of violent crimes as serious felonies constitute an ex post facto violation of the three strikes law?

Defendant cites People v. James (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1147, where the appellate court found no ex post facto violation. That case involved application of Proposition 21's addition of offenses to the list of serious felonies for three strikes sentencing purposes, in a case where the current offenses were committed March 17, 2000 -- nine days after Proposition 21 took effect -- but the prior convictions were committed before it took effect. (Id. at p. 1149.) Though Proposition 21 made the designations retroactive, the

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trial court struck prior conviction allegations for offenses committed before Proposition 21's effective date, on ex post facto grounds. The appellate court reversed, holding there was no ex post facto violation. In light of Proposition 21's purpose to increase public safety, the determination whether a prior conviction alleged as a serious felony is a prior strike must be based on whether the prior offense resulting in that conviction was a serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law on the effective date of Proposition 21. (Id. at p. 1151.) Defendant also cites Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1302, which held -- in a prosecution for offenses committed after the effective date of the three strikes law ( 667, subd. (d)(1)) -- that the statute applied to prior felony convictions which fit the definition of serious or violent felonies on the statute's effective date, even though they were not on the list at the time of the prior convictions.