Does the litigation privilege protect an attorney against a plaintiff in a personal injury action?

any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech . . . shall be subject to a special motion to strike . . . . [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1056.) " 'Any act,' " the court observed, "includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action" and "qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation. [Citations.]" (Ibid., italics added.) The court in Rusheen, however, did not analyze whether the attorney's acts were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Rather, the court examined only the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysiswhether Rusheen could prevail on the merits against the attorney's claim that his actions were protected by the litigation privilege. (Id. at pp. 1055, 1057-1065; see, e.g., Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1193 ["communications with 'some relation' to judicial proceedings" are "absolutely immune from tort liability" by the litigation privilege].)

In Rusheen, it was not disputed that the attorney's actions in securing the judgment were protected by the litigation privilege. The narrow question posed was whether the act of levying on a judgment, although noncommunicative in nature, was nonetheless protected by the privilege. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1061, see, e.g., Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1196 [the privilege applies if the injury resulted from an act that was "communicative in [its] essential nature"].) The court concluded it was so protected, because the gravamen of the cause of action was not the act of levying, but rather the procurement of the judgment using allegedly perjured declarations. (Rusheen, supra, at p. 1062.) The court reasoned that the levy was merely a means to carry out the wrongfully procured judgment, and was therefore a "necessarily related noncommunicative act[]." (Ibid.)