Does the fact that he and the two excused jurors are African-American constitute sufficient evidence to establish discriminatory purpose?

Appellant argues the fact that he and the two excused jurors are African-American is alone sufficient to establish the inference of the prosecutor's discriminatory purpose. Although we agree such evidence supports an inference of discrimination, there are other circumstances in the record that dispel that inference. The prosecutor exercised two of her five peremptory challenges against African-Americans. The record does not disclose whether other African-Americans were called to the jury box and ultimately heard the case. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to discern a pattern from which we can infer the prosecutor was exercising her challenges in a discriminatory manner. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615.)

In addition, based on the two jurors' responses to questioning, there were clear race-neutral reasons for excusing them. Juror number 14 felt that his brother was wrongfully accused of crimes and the juror expressed distrust of police officers. He also had personal prior negative experiences with law enforcement. Juror number 8 believed that he had been treated poorly by police as a victim of a shooting, suggesting that everyone at the scene of the incident drew the same conclusion. These expressions of dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system or law enforcement disclose ample race-neutral reasons for their excusal. (See People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 907-908.)