Does the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act bar a plaintiff from claiming that she was discriminated against because she needed to have a hysterectomy?

Real parties cite Davaris v. Cubaleski (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1583, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, in support of their assertion that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act bars petitioner's claim. In Davaris, the plaintiff claimed that she had been discriminated against when, after informing her employer that she needed time off in order to have a hysterectomy, she was terminated from employment.

The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It ruled that the injuries alleged fell within the purview of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Plaintiff appealed. She asserted that her employer's conduct violated " 'the public policy of this state to encourage proper medical care.' " (Davaris v. Cubaleski, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 330.)