Does the exclusionary rule apply to search for a person who has been released from custody under PRCS?

^3. Because we have upheld the legality of the search at issue, we need not reach the application of Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2d 496]--on which we ordered supplemental briefing--to this case. We note, however, that the nature of the officer's conduct here does not warrant application of the exclusionary rule. "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. . . . [T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." (Id. at p. 144.) Here, there is no evidence that any negligence on the officer's part in failing to independently verify his (accurate) knowledge and recollection that defendant was searchable was deliberate, systemic, or even close to grossly negligent.

^4. Because "[a] PRCS search condition, like a parole search condition, is imposed on all individuals subject to PRCS," and "PRCS, like parole, . . . includes a statutory mandatory search condition," "an individual who has been released from custody under PRCS is subject to search (and detention incident thereto) so long as the officer knows the individual is on PRCS." (People v. Douglas, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 864, 865.) When PRCS is involved, "[i]t is not necessary for the officer to recite or for the People to prove the precise terms of release, for the search condition is imposed by law, not by consent. As in the case of a parole search, an officer's knowledge that the individual is on PRCS is equivalent to knowledge that he or she is subject to a search condition." (Id. at p. 865.)