Does the exclusionary rule apply to police misconduct?

benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry on 'the flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue. . . . [] The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion 'var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct' at issue. [Citation.] When the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. [Citation.] But when the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful, [citation], or when their conduct involves only simple, 'isolated' negligence, [citation] the ' "deterrence rationale loses much of its force," ' and exclusion cannot 'pay its way.' " (Davis v. United States, supra at p. 238.) Law enforcement officers acting in accordance with binding appellate precedent are "not culpable in any way," and thus do not require deterrence and "the harsh sanction of exclusion." (Id. at p. 239-240.) Because "[a]n officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than ' "ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act" ' under the circumstances," we do not " ' "[p]enaliz[e] the officer for the [appellate judges'] error." ' " (Id. at p. 241.) Thus, "[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule."⁷ (Ibid.)