Does the diminished capacity defense now apply to involuntary manslaughter?

Defendant acknowledges the effect of the foregoing statutory amendments. But, citing a trial court's sua sponte duty to instruct on the generally applicable relevant legal principles closely and openly connected with the evidence, including "instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present" (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154), he argues "since evidence of a mental defect or disorder . . . is not limited to express malice . . ., the jury could have found, and the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct . . ., that it could find [him] not guilty of murder and guilty of involuntary manslaughter . . . ." The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the full effect of the diminished capacity defense's abolition.

In People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether he acted with the intent to kill. On appeal from his first degree murder conviction, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by failing to also instruct the jury sua sponte that it could consider his intoxication in relation to whether he acted with premeditation and deliberation.