Does the death of a spouse affect the disposition of the parties' property in an interlocutory divorce?

Klebora v. Klebora (1931) 118 Cal.App. 613, 5 P.2d 965, illustrates the rule. There the court granted the husband an interlocutory decree of divorce and awarded him all of the community property. Prior to entrance of the final decree the husband died. In a subsequent suit the wife sought to upset the disposition of the parties' property in the interlocutory decree. The wife contended that 'the death of one of the spouses before the year has run is productive of the same legal consequences as to property rights settled by an interlocutory decree, as those produced with respect to the marital status; in other words, that death automatically vacates the adjudication and sets the question of property rights at large.' (Id. at p. 619, 5 P.2d at p. 968.) In rejecting this analysis, the court said, "when the interlocutory decree deals with the status of the parties and also with the property rights of the parties, the case is quite different, and the interlocutory decree * * * becomes a conclusive decree as to their property rights.' (Id. at p. 618, 5 P.2d at p. 967.)

Similarly, in Darter v. Magnussen (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 714, 718, 342 P.2d 528, 531, the husband, after his wife's death, undertook to modify the provision in the interlocutory decree [62 Cal.2d 145] awarding a sizable portion of the community property to the wife. The court held that 'when the interlocutory decree becomes final (by lapse of time for an appeal or by death of one spouse) it is a conclusive adjudication and is res judicata

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Finally, in Newhall v. Melone (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 121, 18 Cal.Rptr. 476, 19 Cal.Rptr. 28, the divorce court entered an order erroneously apportioning an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff's counsel. Prior to a hearing to reapportion the fees, defendant died. The court rejected the contention of defendant's representatives that defendant's death abated the proceeding and precluded the court from fixing the amount of the fees. The court aptly stated that '* * * the death of one of the parties does not prevent the courts from taking action to enforce the rights adjudicated prior to the death of one of the parties.' (Id. at p. 124, 18 Cal.Rptr. at p. 478.) Even though the fee had not yet been fixed, the court said that the right to the award had been established; any determination of the amount of such an award was an 'allocation' of it and hence an enforcement of a property right.