Does the court need to consider the adequacy of the expungement process when it comes to expunting DNA evidence of a qualifying crime?

The court says it need not consider the adequacy of the expungement process because Buza was "charged with and ultimately convicted of a qualifying crime." (Maj. opn., ante , 230 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 699, 413 P.3d at p. 1147.) But the question is whether it was constitutional to require Buza to provide his DNA after his arrest on January 21, 2009before he was charged or convicted. In answering this question, it certainly matters how his DNA would be analyzed, used, and retained, and we must address these considerations from the vantage point that existed at the time Buza was required to provide his DNA. (See People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795, 108 Cal.Rptr. 852, 511 P.2d 1204 [" 'The question of the reasonableness of the officers' conduct is determined on the basis of the information possessed by the officer at the time a decision to act is made .' "].) We cannot ignore the (in)adequacy of expungementthe statute's only safeguard against overbroad retentionbased on the fortuity that Buza turned out to be guilty. (See McDonald v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 451, 453, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 [the "guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike"].)