Does the court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the probative value of testifying to the Court that every fingerprint is unique?

Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, that the probative value of Cole's testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and that it would necessitate undue consumption of time. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) Cole agreed that every fingerprint is in fact unique, but challenged an analyst's ability to make an identification to a 100 percent certainty. He based this challenge on anecdotal evidence of a small number of erroneous identifications out of millions of correct identifications over the past 100 years. As the court stated, "I would be amiss, I think, in letting a man testify about a case out of a hundred-year history and having him talk about a case or two or 22 in which out of the history of the process these kinds of corrections have to be made." The court also observed that, unlike DNA evidence, "fingerprint identification is something which the

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