Does the clear and convincing standard need to be taken into account when reviewing substantial evidence?

Thus it has long been the law that appellate inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a criminal conviction both accounts for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof that applied before the trial court and extends an appropriate degree of deference to the perspective of the trier of fact. And with infrequent exceptions, appellate courts have grasped what this kind of review entails. This experience contradicts respondents argument that a rule that requires the clear and convincing standard of proof to be taken into account when reviewing for substantial evidence will encourage these same courts to overstep their authority by reweighing the evidence themselves. Out of an abundance of caution, however, we use this opportunity to emphasize that as in criminal appeals involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court reviewing a finding made pursuant to the clear and convincing standard does not reweigh the evidence itself. In assessing how the evidence reasonably could have been evaluated by the trier of fact, an appellate court reviewing such a finding is to view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below; it must indulge reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence; it must accept the factfinder's resolution of conflicting evidence; and it may not insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment. (See, e.g., People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 35-36, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 459 P.3d 10 ;

[9 Cal.5th 1009]

People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278, 307, 240 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 430 P.3d 791.) To paraphrase the high court in Jackson , supra , 443 U.S. at page 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, the question before a court reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is not whether the appellate court itself regards the evidence as clear and convincing; it is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence as satisfying this standard of proof.